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MACHINE LEARNING EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT 
Patrick W. Nutter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is gaining traction in legal practice.  How 
prosecutors prioritize which crimes to prosecute,1 sift through mountains of 
documents,2 and establish reasonable suspicion3 can all reasonably be 
expected to change with coming AI technologies.  While lawyers need not 
attain expert-level knowledge of these processes, some competency in 
concepts and vocabulary will be essential, in the same manner it has been 
with other sciences, like statistical evidence or DNA analysis.  In that vein, 
this Comment aims to give attorneys a much-needed look inside the “black 
box” of one emerging type of AI technology, machine learning.  With at least 
some familiarity with how machine learning works, attorneys can begin to 
formulate questions and strategies when that kind of technology produces 
substantive evidence at trial.  These include potential issues under the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence, none of 
which, I argue, would categorically bar machine learning evidence.  After 
establishing that machine learning evidence is admissible, I explain how 
counsel for both sides must be aware of the significant issues with machine 
learning that nonetheless could affect the weight such evidence is assigned by 
the trier of fact.  
Machine learning refers to a process in which a “machine has been 
‘trained’ through exposure to a large quantity of data and infers a rule from 
the patterns it observes.”4  The technology, once only theoretical, is now 
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 1 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 732 (2016) 
(“[T]he predictive prosecution model shifts the identification of problem areas from the street cops 
to the lawyers.”). 
 2 Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 110–15 (2014). 
 3 See Stephanie Lacambra, Predictive Policing: A Guide for Criminal Defense Attorneys, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/2017/10/30/predictive_policing_one_pager.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2018) (defining and explaining the use of “predictive policing” by law enforcement).  
 4 Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 679 (2017). 
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responsible for many tasks in daily digital life.  For instance, machine learning 
is at work when Facebook automatically recognizes a user in a photo5 or 
when an email client automatically routes spam to the appropriate folder.6  
For many litigators, it will only be a matter of time before they first 
encounter a creative opposing counsel who wishes to admit machine learning 
output into evidence.  When that happens, both sides in the interests of 
clients—and the court in the interest of the law itself—must be equipped with 
certain questions and skepticism.  This Comment aims to look ahead to 
possible evidentiary issues when, not if, the output of machine learning 
algorithms is used as substantive evidence in criminal prosecution.  
In the very near future, AI software will affect criminal and civil litigation 
in at least three significant ways.  First, AI will pose the critical question of 
whether and to what extent the decision of the algorithm exposes the user to 
liability.7  For example, in the employment context, when an algorithm pre-
screens resumes and, not by intentional design, discounts the resumes of 
women or minorities, is the employer liable for discrimination?8  Or, since 
the technology will soon be deployed on police body cameras,9 could real-
time object recognition software perhaps assist an officer by identifying 
whether a gun or a smartphone is in the suspect’s hand, and what liability 
might exist if the algorithm decided incorrectly?10  Second, AI will also alter 
predictive technologies in the criminal justice system, such as ones that may 
 
 5 See Daniel Terdiman, Facebook’s Image-Recognition Tech Is Teaching 40,000 Images a Second to Understand 
Context, FAST CO., (June 8, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40428910/facebooks-image-
recognition-tech-is-teaching-40000-images-a-second-to-understand-context (“For [Facebook’s] 
1.94 billion monthly users, artificial intelligence and machine learning are behind the ability to 
quickly surface meaningful baby pictures, vacation selfies, and pet action photos.”). 
 6 See Surden, supra note 2, at 90–93 (discussing email spam filters as an example of machine learning). 
 7 See generally Rebecca J. Krystosek, The Algorithm Made Me Do It and Other Bad Excuses: Upholding 
Traditional Liability Principles for Algorithm-caused Harm, MINN. L. REV. DE NOVO (May 17, 2017), 
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2017/05/the-algorithm-made-me-do-it-and-other-bad-
excuses/ (discussing various forms of legal liability for the actions and decisions of algorithms).  
 8 See Hannah Devlin, AI Programs Exhibit Racial and Gender Biases, Research Reveals, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 
2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/13/ai-programs-exhibit-
racist-and-sexist-biases-research-reveals (“One previous study showed that an identical CV is 50% 
more likely to result in an interview invitation if the candidate’s name is European American than 
if it is African American.  The latest results suggest that algorithms, unless explicitly programmed 
to address this, will be riddled with the same social prejudices.”). 
 9 See Drew Harwell, Facial Recognition May Be Coming to a Police Body Camera Near You, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/26/facial-
recognition-may-be-coming-to-a-police-body-camera-near-you/?utm_term=.46192f40bfda 
(describing the growing use of facial recognition software in police body cameras).   
 10 See, e.g., Eric Levenson, Madison Park & Darran Simon, Sacramento Police Shot Man Holding Cellphone 
in His Grandmother’s Yard, CNN (Mar. 22, 2018) https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/22/us/ 
sacramento-police-shooting/index.html (reporting a shooting of a man holding a cell phone by an 
officer who believed the phone to be a gun).  
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aid in investigations, establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause,11 or 
assist sentencing judges in estimating a defendant’s chances of reoffending.12  
Third, AI can aid the legal reasoning process itself.  For example, to 
understand the original public meaning of the Second Amendment’s “bear 
arms,” it would surely be illuminating to examine a corpus of 1.3 billion 
words—from books, handwritten diaries, newspapers, etc.—for the use of 
the phrase “bear arms” in the centuries surrounding the Amendment’s 
drafting, a task that has been accomplished with AI technology.13  
Despite the important developments and commentary on those evolving 
issues, this Comment focuses specifically on using the conclusions of machine 
learning processes as substantive evidence in litigation.  For instance, in a 
blurry surveillance video or an unclear audio recording, the naked eye and 
ear may be insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but certain 
recognition algorithms could do so easily.  Lip-reading algorithms might tell 
jurors what was said on video where there is no audio available.14  A machine 
might construct an estimation of a perpetrator’s face from only a DNA 
sample,15 or in other DNA analysis of corrupted samples.16  
 
 11 See generally Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 
164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016) (discussing the role of machine learning will play in the Fourth 
Amendment context). 
 12 See Ellora Thadaney Israni, Opinion, When an Algorithm Helps Send You to Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/opinion/algorithm-compas-sentencing-
bias.html (criticizing the use of a risk assessment algorithm as a factor in a criminal sentencing).  
 13 See Johnson, Arms and the Man, ECONOMIST (June 9, 2018), http://media.economist.com/news/ 
books-and-arts/21743640-big-data-can-help-clarify-meaning-second-amendment-judges-should-
pay (advocating for the use of “digital corpora”  to determine the meaning of the term “bear arms”).  
 14 See Jamie Condliffe, AI Has Beaten Humans at Lip-reading, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 21, 2016), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602949/ai-has-beaten-humans-at-lip-reading/ (describing 
two studies in which artificial intelligence vastly outperformed humans at lip-reading). 
 15 The leading company offering this particular service is Virginia-based Parabon Nanolabs, which uses 
machine learning processes to predict visible traits (e.g., facial structure, eye and hair color, etc.) from 
DNA samples alone.  See How DNA Phenotyping Works, PARABON NANOLABS, 
https://snapshot.parabon-nanolabs.com/#phenotyping-how (last visited Mar. 7, 2018) (“Parabon’s 
scientists use machine learning algorithms to combine the selected set of SNPs into a complex 
mathematical equation for the genetic architecture of the trait.”).  Parabon’s service has already been 
used in several investigations.  See, e.g., Alicia Victoria Lozano, Montgomery County Officials Use DNA 
Samples to Create Picture of Rape Suspect, NBC PHILA. (Jan. 16, 2018, 3:12 PM), 
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Montgomery-County-Phenotyping-DNA-Testing-
Rape-Suspect-Norristown-Farm-Park-469588793.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2018, 7:29 
PM)(discussing the Montgomery County District Attorney Office’s use of Parabon’s DNA technology 
to create an illustration of a suspected rapist).   It is, however, not without critics.  One, Peter Claes, 
an expert in craniofacial morphometrics at the University of Leuven, thinks that in some cases the 
images have virtually no value.  To him, one image “just looked like an average black man.  It didn’t 
have any characteristic features.  That reconstruction didn’t give any more information than the 
genetic background that they listed.  This prediction is hardly specific so it doesn’t really focus on an 
individual . . . .”  Howard Wolinsky, CSI on Steroids, 16 EMBO REP. 782, 782 (2015).   
 16 See Under the Microscope—Jonathan Adelman & Michael Marciano, ISHI (Sept. 21, 2017), 
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The legal issues of broadly defined “machine evidence” have been 
extensively cataloged and discussed, especially in the Fourth and Sixth 
Amendment contexts.17  Such machine evidence includes radar guns, 
breathalyzers, DNA analysis software, GPS, and risk assessment software.18  
However, few have explored machine learning as a distinct species of 
machine evidence, distinct even from evidence produced using traditional 
computer programs,19 with its own vocabulary and unique set of issues.  
Importantly, that lack of analysis means there has been little exploration of 
the legal pitfalls of machine learning—the ways in which it goes awry, is 
misused, or is misinterpreted.  In some ways, the reliability issues of machine 
learning algorithms are similar to those already cataloged with respect to 
typical computer software; but in other critical respects, machine learning 
poses unique questions of reliability.  Like other machine evidence has done 
in the past, machine learning will give rise to new evidentiary issues.  
Ultimately, however, I argue that in most cases machine learning evidence 
will not be barred by either the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. 
Part I begins with an overview of how courts currently treat software 
output as evidence.  Machine learning is revolutionary in its applications and 
capabilities, though, with respect to its potential uses in prosecution, it is 
functionally similar to traditional software: data go in and conclusions come 
out.  In between, there is a “black box” of calculations that few in the 
courtroom understand.  Part II explains how machine learning is distinct from 
traditional computer software in process and appropriate uses.  Part III offers 
an explanation of how contemporary machine learning typically works.  
In Part IV, I analyze machine learning evidence under Federal Rule 702 
and its Daubert criteria and find that machine learning would surely meet the 
requirements for admissible expert testimony.  
In Part V, I argue that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments pose no 
categorical barrier to machine learning evidence but limit how it may be 
introduced.  I argue first that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
does not bar machine learning evidence and, second, that pursuant to the 
Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, machine learning evidence will 
 
https://www.ishinews.com/under-the-microscope-michael-marciano_jonathan_adelman/ 
(interviewing two experts on the issues of DNA mixture interpretation). 
 17 See generally Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972 (2017) [hereinafter Roth, Testimony] 
(attempting to “offer a coherent framework for conceptualizing and regulating machine evidence”); 
Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245 (2016) [hereinafter Roth, Trial] (discussing the 
rise of machines in criminal adjudication). 
 18 Roth, Testimony, supra note 17, at 2015, 2025, 2027. 
 19 See Christian Chessman, Note, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, and the 
Constitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 183–84 (2017) (discussing evidentiary issues with respect to 
conventional computer software).  
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likely only be admissible in the form of expert testimony.  
In Part VI, having concluded that machine learning evidence will likely 
be admissible in at least some cases, I emphasize that there are significant 
problems with the weight such evidence should be assigned by the finder of 
fact because of machine learning’s unique unexplainability, that is, in many 
cases it is impossible to explain how a machine learning algorithm makes a 
particular conclusion.  
I.  MACHINE EVIDENCE AND BLACK BOXES 
Evidence is “[s]omething (including testimony, documents, and tangible 
objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact” or, 
more generally, “anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the 
existence or nonexistence of a fact.”20  In a criminal proceeding, evidence, 
and the inferences that logically can be drawn from it, must ultimately 
support the factfinder’s conclusion of guilt.21  The primary purpose of rules 
of evidence is to narrow the evidence offered at trial, sometimes to limit 
evidence to what is relevant and probative, other times to prevent the 
factfinder from drawing illogical conclusions or to minimize the possibility of 
unfair prejudice to the accused.22  Where the Federal Rules of Evidence 
apply, they explicitly instruct courts to construe them in a manner that will 
“administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and 
delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of 
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”23 
How guilt may be established has evolved over the course of the Anglo-
American legal tradition.  Whereas documentary evidence and human 
testimony have been mainstays of criminal proceedings, other forms of 
evidence have unfortunately come and thankfully gone, including 
phrenology24 and “spectral evidence” (i.e., the “testimony of the bewitched 
 
 20 Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 21 1 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1:2 (15th ed. 1997) 
 22 Id.  
 23 FED. R. EVID. 102. 
 24 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Cesare Lambroso formulated and evangelized his own 
“scientific” classification of criminals and testified often as an expert witness: 
  He noticed in the skull of a murderer an anomalous depression characteristic of lower 
species, such as dogs. . . . Lombroso speculated that such a skull reflected an underlying 
brain abnormality of an atavistic nature.  That is, perhaps the brain of the murderer 
suggested a more primitive development of a lower species.  Lombroso gathered large 
quantities of data from measurements on criminals and proposed that certain criminals 
represented a distinct species, homo delinquens.  As his reputation grew, others also subscribed 
to his theory that at least some criminals are born, not made, and criminal types could be 
identified by the shapes of their skulls.  Lombroso was called upon as an expert witness on 
numerous occasions to testify as to whether a defendant was of a criminal disposition. 
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that an accused person’s spectral shape appeared to them at a time when 
their physical body was elsewhere”).25  “Machine evidence,” however, has 
come and stayed.  Over the past 150 years, the “silent testimony of 
instruments” has supplemented the testimony of humans.26  Only rarely have 
courts found that science had progressed too far beyond what the given rules 
of evidence can comfortably handle and thus resisted a new technology as 
evidence.27  Instead, the law has typically been receptive to new scientific 
discoveries and their potential evidentiary uses.28  
Overall, “this shift from human- to machine-generated proof has, on the 
whole, enhanced accuracy and objectivity in fact finding.”29  And yet, for all 
its advantages, machine testimony is not without risks, such as when society 
determines that it must err on the side of overinclusion and reduction of false 
negatives, notwithstanding such a policy’s inherent risk that machines will 
erroneously inculpate the innocent.30  This Comment highlights that risk, as 
well as another: that machines are improperly afforded a presumption of 
reliability, even when jurors cannot peer into the “black box” that is 
providing them with evidence.  “These ‘black box’ processes, because of their 
mechanical appearance and apparently simple output, have a veneer of 
objectivity and certainty.”31  However, even though these machines appear 
neutral, they are necessarily the product of human creation, and therefore 
human judgment, with its risk of bias and tendency to make mistakes.32  
 
  Richard L. Elliott, Neuropsychiatry in the Courtroom, 62 MERCER L. REV. 933, 939 (2011). 
 25 See Sarah Kruetter, The Devil’s Specter: Spectral Evidence and the Salem Witchcraft Crisis, 2 SPECTRUM: A 
SCHOLARS DAY J., 1, 1 (2011) (“This was a key point of proof delivered against accused witches at 
Salem in 1692.   Spectral evidence is impossible to prove and courts used it with caution in court 
cases prior to Salem. . . .  [Y]et nearly every case during the Salem outbreak featured this 
evidence.”). 
 26 Roth, Trial, supra note 17, at 1253 (quoting MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 143 
(1997)); see id. (“‘[S]cientific gadgets in the law of evidence’ and interpretive forensic and diagnostic 
software has reduced the role of both percipient and human witnesses in proving guilt.” (quoting Note, 
Scientific Gadgets in the Law of Evidence, 53 HARV. L. REV. 285, 285 (1939) [hereinafter Scientific Gadgets])).  
 27 See, e.g., People v. Offermann, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179, 185 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953) (explaining that the case 
was the very first to use a radar gun reading as evidence and holding that the New York legislature 
should enact new rules of evidence to explicitly allow for its admissibility).  
 28 Scientific Gadgets, supra note 26, at 285 (“It is the perennial boast of the law that in the ascertainment 
of facts it will avail itself of any accepted scientific discovery.”). 
 29 Roth, Testimony, supra note 17, at 1976.  
 30 Roth, Trial, supra note 17, at 1269  (“[M]echanization has arisen in criminal justice in an 
unbalanced way, reflecting the focus of law enforcement, interest groups, and lawmakers on 
reducing a particular species of inaccuracy: false negatives.”).  
 31 Id. at 1269–70. 
 32 Id. at 1270 (“In truth, these processes all have hidden subjectivities and errors that often go 
unrecognized and unchecked, thus potentially ‘facilitat[ing] the masking of illegitimate or illegal 
discrimination behind layers upon layers of mirrors and proxies.’ (quoting Omer Tene & Jules 
Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man:  Individual Rights in the Age of Big Data, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 351, 358 (2013)). 
 




Even so, machine evidence—and, for the purposes of this Comment, 
specifically evidence derived from algorithmic software processes—supports 
guilty verdicts daily.  By their conduct, courts have expressed a tolerance for 
some level of both ignorance and risk in machine evidence: ignorance in how 
these processes work, and risk that they might not “get it right” every time.  
For example, photographic evidence, breathalyzer readouts, and DNA tests 
have been admitted into evidence for decades, in spite of their risk of error 
in programming or hidden reliance on subjective human judgment.33  In 
recent cases involving TrueAllele, a probabilistic genotypic software,34 the 
black box has only gotten blacker, and courts have yet to reject its use on that 
basis.  Indeed, TrueAllele’s most marketable feature is the assumptions it uses 
to remove user (that is, lab technician) judgment from the DNA match 
determination, effectively promoting its “veneer of objectivity and certainty.”   
This merely passes the buck, however, as the user’s judgment is only 
substituted for that of the initial programmer of the software, who, as of now, 
has never revealed his complete methodology and has not been subject to 
cross-examination.35  
Overall, then, courts have long been comfortable with machine evidence 
whose processes are not entirely disclosed to, or understood by, the judge, 
jury, parties, or counsel.  And it is likely that courts will find similar comfort 
in machine learning processes.  
II.  WHAT MACHINE LEARNING IS 
A.  Machine Learning in the Artificial Intelligence Context 
Technologies that claim the artificial intelligence label are proliferating in 
number and application.  A 2016 Stanford University report lists no fewer than 
eight broad sectors that researchers are hoping to transform with AI, including 
critical areas like education, healthcare, transportation, the workplace, and 
public safety.36  Yet for many AI researchers, listing even eight sectors is too 
 
 33 Id. at 1272–73 (discussing the potential errors and human judgments that inform how photographs, 
breathalyzers, and DNA tests operate).  
 34 Probabilistic genotyping “uses complex mathematical formulas to examine the statistical likelihood 
that a certain genotype comes from one individual over another.”  Jessica Pishko, The Impenetrable 
Program Transforming How Courts Treat DNA Evidence, WIRED (Nov. 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/trueallele-software-transforming-how-courts-treat-dna-evidence.  
 35 Roth, Trial, supra note 17, at 1273–74. 
 36 COMMITTEE OF THE ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, STUDY 
PANEL, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030, at 4 (2016).   
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conservative: AI will simply transform everything.37 To them, that future is 
“when,” not “if.”  The necessary technologies are already here, but their wider 
applications are presently constrained only by human imagination, 
management,38 and the sheer lack of people working in the field.39  
AI has infected the discourse of business and culture perhaps because it 
seems to refer to so many things.  Firms increasingly market themselves as 
incorporating AI into their products and services,40 though sometimes they 
use the AI label inaccurately, applying its traditional computational methods 
only for more marketing heft.41  More often, the term is used in platitudes 
about market “disruption,”42 and in fact “AI” may now be used so loosely 
that it is losing its meaning—what one Georgia Institute of Technology 
professor calls “AI deflation.”43  Even as a field of study, artificial intelligence 
has hazy boundaries, as it refers to many disparate specialties like robotics,44 
transportation,45 human-computer interaction,46 and predictive 
technologies.47  As such, one researcher comments, “the field doesn’t have a 
 
 37 Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Business of Artificial Intelligence, HARV. BUS. REV., July 
2017 at 3, 4 (“The effects of AI will be magnified in the coming decade, as manufacturing, retailing, 
transportation, finance, health care, law, advertising, insurance, entertainment, education, and 
virtually every other industry transform their core processes and business models to take advantage 
of machine learning.”). 
 38 Id. (“The bottleneck now is in management, implementation, and business imagination.”). 
 39 Cade Metz, Tech Giants Are Paying Huge Salaries for Scarce A.I. Talent, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/technology/artificial-intelligence-experts-
salaries.html?_r=1 (“In the entire world, fewer than 10,000 people have the skills necessary to tackle 
serious artificial intelligence research . . . .”).  
 40 See, e.g., Kate Kaye, Is This AI or BS?  Artificial Intelligence Is All the Rage, but Sometimes It’s Just Hype, 
ADAGE (Apr. 19, 2017), http://adage.com/article/datadriven-marketing/ai-bs/308718/ 
(discussing the marketing power and oversimplification of the buzzwords “artificial intelligence”). 
 41 Brynjolfsson & McAffee, supra note37, at 4 (“Simply calling a dating site ‘AI-powered,’ for example, 
doesn’t make it any more effective, but it might help with fundraising.”). 
 42 See e.g., The AI Disruption Bundle: The Guide to Understanding How Artificial Intelligence Is Impacting the World, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2017, 3:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/understanding-artificial-
intelligence-impacting-world-2017-10 (describing artificial intelligence as disruptive). 
 43 Ian Bogost, ‘Artificial Intelligence’ Has Become Meaningless, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/what-is-artificial-intelligence/ 
518547/ (referencing artificial intelligence robots). 
 44 Felix Ingrand & Mark Ghallab, Robotics and Artificial Intelligence: A Perspective on Deliberation Functions, 
AI COMMUNICATIONS, IOS PRESS (Apr. 3, 2015), https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-
01138117/document (discussing AI and robotics).  
 45 See generally Sebastian Ramos et al., Detecting Unexpected Obstacles for Self-Driving Cars: Fusing Deep 
Learning and Geometric Modeling, ARXIV.ORG (Dec. 20, 2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.06573.pdf 
(discussing AI and cars). 
 46 See generally Jose Maria Garcia-Garcia et al., Emotional Detection: A Technology Review, RESEARCHGATE 
(2017), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jose_Garcia-Garcia4/publication/ 
320359659_Emotion_detection_a_technology_review/links/59e620a2a6fdcc3dcd33e82f/Emotio
n-detection-a-technology-review.pdf (discussing human-AI interactions).  
 47 See generally David Silver et al., Mastering the Game of Go Without Human Knowledge, 550 NATURE 356 
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coherent theory.”48  
B.  Machine Learning Versus Traditional Computer Programming 
In previous decades, machines operated according to rules that humans 
painstakingly programmed by hand, “writing code of exactly what [they] 
want[ed] the machine to do.”49  This method of computation powered all 
the wide array of computer applications through the twentieth century, but 
it could not automate the many tasks that humans do that cannot be 
practically reduced to sets of rules.  One such task is facial recognition.  Using 
the example of how he can easily recognize his mother’s face, one AI 
researcher comments, “I . . . recognize it but I couldn’t really write code to 
do it.”50  It is for this reason, according to Polanyi’s paradox, that there are 
fundamental limits to how much knowledge humans can impart to 
machines.51  More recently, however, machine learning has emerged as a 
revolutionary subfield of AI because it can circumvent that limitation.  
In short, machine learning refers to a program’s ability to “extract[ ] 
patterns from raw data.”52  “Deep learning,” a type of machine learning, has 
powered much of the recent gains in machine learning research.  Deep 
learning programs optimize accuracy and, over time, yield increasingly 
accurate results for a given task.  That is, the machine has the “ability to keep 
improving its performance without humans having to explain exactly how to 
accomplish” a task.53  Now, “machines learn on their own things that we 
don’t know how to explain.”54  After being shown thousands or even millions 
of examples,55 the machines learn patterns, correlations, and rules—
 
(2017) (discussing the AI AlphaGo’s use of predictive technology to master the game of Go).   
 48  Jerry Kaplain, AI’s PR Problem, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603761/ais-pr-problem/.   
 49 How AI Is Already Changing Business, HBR IDEACAST (July 20, 2017), https://hbr.org/ 
ideacast/2017/07/how-ai-is-already-changing-business [hereinafter AI Changing Business]. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See Brynjolfsson & McAffee, supra note 37, at 6; see also David H. Autor, Polanyi’s Paradox and the Shape 
of Employment Growth 8 (Nat’l Burea of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20485, 2014) 
(“[E]ngineers cannot program a computer to simulate a process that they (or the scientific 
community at large) do not explicitly understand.  This constraint is more binding than one might 
initially surmise because there are many tasks that we understand tacitly and accomplish effortlessly 
for which we do not know the explicit ‘rules’ or procedures.”).  
 52 IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 2–3 (9th ed.2016).  
 53 Brynjolfsson & McAffee, supra note 37, at 4.  
 54 AI Changing Business, supra note 49. 
 55 See Yonghui Wu et al., Google’s Neural Machine Translation System:  Bridging the Gap Between Human and 
Machine Translation, ARXIV.ORG 1, 14 (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1609.08144.pdf (describing 
the process of teaching a machine English to French translation using thirty-six million pairs of 
sentences).  
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sometimes the ones that humans use to accomplish the task but other times 
ones that humans cannot perceive,56 or had not used previously.57  Indeed, 
many times the programmer him- or herself cannot account for how the 
machine came to a particular result, even if the result is correct.58  Tasks that 
were once impossible to automate are now on par with human experts, 
including not only facial recognition,59 but also skin cancer detection60 and 
some types of language translation.61  
With many applications emerging, and far more on the horizon, it is 
inevitable that attorneys will do with machine learning what they have done 
before with all manner of devices, machines, and technical software: use it to 
win.  Law firms are already incorporating machine learning software into 
other aspects of their business, like e-discovery,62 while government 
regulators have begun to use machine learning to assist in investigating fraud 
and other white-collar crimes.63  Prosecutors, specifically, may find several 
aspects of their work affected by machine learning, including justifying 
 
 56 See, e.g., Heather Murphy, Why Stanford Researchers Tried to Create a ‘Gaydar’ Machine, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 
9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/science/stanford-sexual-orientation-study.html 
(using photos of gay men and straight men, an AI was able to use aspects of the human face to 
predict a man’s sexual orientation with up to ninety-one percent accuracy).  
 57 Id.  
 58 Andreas Holzinger et al., What Do We Need to Build Explainable AI Systems for the Medical Domain?, 
ARXIV.ORG (2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.09923.pdf (“However, the central problem of 
such models is that they are regarded as black-box models and even if we understand the underlying 
mathematical principles of such models they lack an explicit declarative knowledge representation, 
hence we have difficulty in generating the underlying explanatory structures.”).   
 59 See generally Will Knight, Paying with Your Face, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar.–Apr. 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603494/10-breakthrough-technologies-2017-paying-with-
your-face/ (detailing how researchers have shown their programs rival most humans in ability to 
recognize faces).  
 60 Andre Esteva et al., Dermatologist-level Classification of Skin Cancer with Deep Neural Networks, 542 
NATURE 115, 115 (2017).  
 61 Wu et al., supra note 55, at 19.  
 62 See Avaneesh Marwaha, Seven Benefits of Artificial Intelligence for Law Firms, LAW TECH. TODAY (July 
13, 2017), http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2017/07/seven-benefits-artificial-intelligence-
law-firms/; Catalyst, How AI and Machine-Learning Tools Lighten the eDiscovery Load, ABOVE L. (May 
17, 2017, 3:02 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2017/05/how-ai-and-machine-learning-tools-
lighten-the-ediscovery-load/; Julie Sobowale, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the Legal 
Profession, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 2016),  http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
how_artificial_intelligence_is_transforming_the_legal_profession (all outlining how AI is used to 
save time in discovery). 
 63 Gerard Hoberg & Craig Lewis, Do Fraudulent Firms Produce Abnormal Disclosure? 1–3 (Vand. Owen 
Graduate Sch. of Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2298302, 2015), (using a topic modeling technique 
that discovers clusters of text to predict whether a firm’s SEC disclosure shows signs that the firm is 
committing fraud); Scott W. Bauguess, The Hope and Limitations of Machine Learning in Market Risk 
Assessment, SEC (Mar. 6, 2015), https://cfe.columbia.edu/files/seasieor/center-financial-
engineering/presentations/MachineLearningSECRiskAssessment030615public.pdf (discussing 
how the SEC could produce a model to help detect illicit behavior). 
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searches64 and determining which crimes to prosecute.65  Though machine 
learning has not yet been widely used to produce evidence itself, the 
capability, accessibility, and incentives to do so already exist.  
III.  HOW MACHINE LEARNING WORKS 
A machine learning program extracts useful patterns out of a large 
collection of data to perform a certain task.66  To be clear, the learning itself 
is not the ultimate goal, but rather the means to achieve that goal.67  
“Learning,” in this context, refers to an improvement in performance of the 
task over time.68  Practicing attorneys can at least grasp the fundamentals of 
machine learning by becoming familiar with the tasks these programs can 
perform and the processes by which the machines “learn.” 
A.  Tasks 
Machines can learn to perform many tasks.  The most common include 
classification (e.g., image or facial recognition), classification with missing 
inputs (e.g., recognizing an object or face from a corrupted or incomplete 
image), regression (e.g., predicting a numerical value given certain 
conditions), transcription (e.g., speech-to-text software), machine translation 
(e.g., translating from one natural language to another), structured output 
(e.g., image recognition in which the machine can describe the image in 
grammatical sentences), anomaly detection (e.g., credit card fraud detection), 
synthesis and sampling (i.e., the machine generates new examples similar to 
the examples it has learned), imputation of missing values (i.e., predicting 
certain data points given other data points), and denoising (i.e., match an 
inputted “corrupted” exampled to a “clean” example).69 
Many of the emerging or possible evidentiary applications of machine 
learning fall into these general categories.  For instance, risk assessment in 
parole hearings could be accomplished with a regression analysis.70  Facial 
recognition could identify a defendant even with video or photographic 
 
 64 See generally Rich, supra note 11 (discussing machine learning and the Fourth Amendment).  
 65 See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 732 (“[T]he predictive prosecution model shifts the identification of 
problem areas from the street cops to the lawyers.”). 
 66 Kaplan, supra note 48. 
 67 See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 97 (explaining that once a specific task is defined, like 
walking, learning how to do the task is not the task itself, but gaining the means to perform the task). 
 68 Id. (“A computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T 
and performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as measured by P, improves with 
experience E.”). 
 69 Id. at 98–101.   
 70 Lacambra, supra note 3.  
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evidence in less than ideal circumstances.71  Body recognition algorithms 
may achieve the same where no facial images are captured.72  Anomaly 
detection can scan corporate filings or other behavior to assess evidence of 
wrongdoing.73  It impossible to catalog all the ways in which machine 
learning may produce evidence, especially as the technology further evolves, 
but suffice to say these are only among the presently foreseeable.  
B.  Learning 
To perform the task, the machine first must learn from examples, which 
are simply a collection of quantified features.74  When the data are already 
numerical, quantification is straightforward.  In other situations, how the 
data is quantified is not immediately obvious or can reflect programmer 
judgment.  For instance, an image of a face is quantified on the basis of pixel 
values that a screen would use to display the image.75  Once the data have 
been translated into numbers, the programmer must take some of the data 
whose properties are already known, referred to as “training data,”76 and 
teach the machine the rules or associations that will be useful when the 
machine later analyzes new data whose properties are not already known.  
This process is referred to as “supervised learning.”77  
To echo the facial recognition example above,78 a programmer at this 
stage will feed a set of pictures of her mother (which the programmer knows 
to be of her mother) into the machine.  Critically, the programmer explicitly 
tells the machine to associate the images of that face with her mother, such 
as by labeling each image with the mother’s name.  At this point, the machine 
knows these images are of the mother not by any inference or computation, 
but because the programmer has told the machine explicitly.  Then, the 
machine analyzes the pictures of the mother’s face and, on its own, 
establishes other associations, correlations, or rules that will enable it to 
 
 71 See John Nawara, Machine Learning: Face Recognition Technology Evidence in Criminal Trials, 49 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 601, 608–09 (2011). 
 72 Chikahito Nakajima et al, Full-body Person Recognition System, 36 PATTERN RECOGNITION 1997, 
1997 (2003) (“We describe a system that learns from examples to recognize person in images taken         
indoors.”). 
 73 Hoberg & Lewis, supra note 63; Bauguess, supra note 63. 
 74 See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 97 (defining example as “a collection of features that 
have been quantitatively measured from some object or event that we want the machine learning 
system to process”); id. at 103 (explaining how “supervised learning” in deep learning computers 
uses sets of data curated and labeled for the neural network to experience). 
 75 Id. at 97 (“[T]he features of an image are usually the values of the pixels in the image.”). 
 76 Id. at 119. 
 77 Id. at 103.  Note that these categories are not clearly defined and may blur at the edges.  
 78 See Nawara, supra note 71. 
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recognize the programmer’s mother in new images it has not seen before.  
For example, the machine might establish rules about skin tone, distance of 
the eyes from one another, and height or width of the face.79  
Once the machine has learned from the training data and deduced some 
set of rules, its performance is then tested and refined on a separate pool of 
testing data, called the “test set,” the properties of which are also known.80  
The programmer then assesses the error rates of the machine’s accuracy and 
makes adjustments.  In the present example, our programmer would at this 
stage feed into the machine new images of her mother that the machine has 
not seen before and test how well it can identify the mother.  When the 
machine has reached some level of accuracy that the researcher feels is 
satisfactory, it is used to analyze real world data.  Ideally, the machine should 
be able to identify the mother in any image where she is present, including 
situations of various image quality, bright or dark lighting, different angles, or 
no matter the mother’s hair style, presence or absence of makeup, differences 
in outfit, or other situations where her appearance is slightly different. 
IV.  ADMISSIBILITY UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702 
When machine learning output is used as substantive evidence in 
litigation in federal court, it most likely will be in the form expert testimony 
governed by Rule 702 and Daubert, though if or how it may be used in state 
courts depends on each state’s rules of evidence.81  Rule 702 governs the 
 
 79 See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 8 (explaining that “deep learning” is a type of machine 
learning that is often used in facial recognition, but is used in other contexts, as well.  In general, 
deep learning is a process of representing abstract concepts in terms of simpler concepts.); see also 
id. at 6 (indicating an abstract concept, like a human face, can be represented as a particular 
arrangement of simpler concepts, like lines, contours, and edges); id. at 8 (describing a typical deep 
learning algorithm would analyze an image first for a series of lines (a relatively simple analysis), 
then for a series of connected and contoured lines (a slightly more complex analysis building upon 
the first), and finally assess if the present arrangement of lines, contours, and edges matches the 
arrangement that the algorithm had learned corresponds to a face ). 
 80 Id. at 106 (explaining how accuracy of the performance data is tested).  
 81 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern all the ways in which machine learning will likely 
infect litigation, such as investigations, bail determinations, and sentencing.  See Robin A. Smith, 
Opening the Lid on Criminal Sentencing Software, DUKE TODAY (July 19, 2017), 
https://today.duke.edu/2017/07/opening-lid-criminal-sentencing-software (explaining the black-
box software of sentencing as a mystery); Laura Smith-Spark, Voice, Words May Provide Key Clues About 
James Foley’s Killer, CNN (Aug. 24, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/22/world/europe/ 
british-jihadi-hunt/index.html (last updated Aug. 24, 2014, 6;07 AM)) (discussing the use of voice 
identification software to identify a hooded ISIS militant); Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail Reform Algorithm 
Contribute to This San Francisco Man’s Murder?, NPR (Aug. 18, 2017, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/08/18/543976003/did-a-bail-reform-algorithm-contribute-to-this-
san-francisco-man-s-murder) (discussing a computer algorithm deciding the fate of a defendant).  
Without the schema of the Federal Rules of Evidence in place, it is safe to assume that those areas 
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admissibility of expert testimony in federal court.82  For a qualified expert to 
testify, the proponent must show that the testimony will assist the trier of fact, 
that the opinion is based on sufficient facts or data, that the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods, and that the principles and 
methods are reliably applied to the instant case.83  When the judge 
determines the admissibility of expert testimony, she is only making “a 
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying 
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”84  The focus is 
not on the conclusions that the methods generate.85 
Machine learning output is likely admissible under both under Daubert 
and the text of Rule 702 itself.  However, the exact manner in which the 
algorithm was created or the way it would be used at trial may, in some cases, 
render it inadmissible.  
A.  Daubert Criteria 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court established a 
general framework for federal courts to assess whether expert testimony is 
the product of “reliable principles and methods” under Rule 702.86  The 
Court lists four non-dispositive considerations, none of which categorically 
bar machine learning evidence.  First, whether the theory or technique can 
be or has been tested; second, whether the theory or technique has been 
subject to peer-reviewed publication; third, the existence of error rates; and 
fourth, whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance in the 
 
are the first where we would see machine learning at work, especially since today those areas are 
seeing non-machine learning algorithms grow in popularity and legal legitimacy.  See, e.g., State v. 
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 752–53 (Wis. 2016) (describing the use of risk assessment algorithms in 
the context of probation, parole, and sentencing); Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575 (Ind. 
2010) (concluding that trial judges “are encouraged” to use risk assessment software to inform 
sentencing decisions). 
 82 Federal Rules of Evidence 702 reads:   
  A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b)      the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c)      the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d)      the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
   FED. R. EVID. 702.  
 83 Id.  
 84 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993). 
 85 Id. at 595 (stating the focus is solely on principles and methodology).   
 86 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702(c). 
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field or scientific community.87 
Machine learning easily satisfies three of the four Daubert factors without 
extensive discussion.  Machine learning evidence would certainly meet the 
testability consideration, since these processes produce results that can be 
shown to be false, sometimes in spectacular ways.  For instance, in 2015, 
Google’s object recognition system falsely identified two African Americans 
as gorillas, quickly prompting outcry and a correction to the algorithm.88  
Machine learning also satisfies Daubert’s peer review consideration, since the 
peer reviewed literature on it has proliferated in recent years, with some of 
its scientific principles dating back to the mid-twentieth century.89  And, 
machine learning enjoys general acceptance in the field or scientific 
community, and practitioners are applying the technology in myriad 
disciplines.90  
Daubert’s requirement that the science have either known or potential 
error rates,91 however, presents a more complicated analysis.  Machine 
learning algorithms indeed have calculable error rates, though the relevance 
of these error rates to the particular situation is oftentimes questionable.  
Machine learning algorithms usually have two important error rates.  
The first is its test set error rate with respect to training data, which are the 
examples whose properties are already known to the researcher and which 
are the basis for the algorithm’s improved performance over time.92  
Eventually, a second error rate captures the algorithm’s performance when 
it is unleashed upon real-world examples with unknown properties.93  Both 
error rates typically appear as a singular number that masks other important 
statistics, like whether the algorithm is more likely to give false positives or 
false negatives, an important detail that should be revealed at a Daubert 
hearing or on cross examination.  
Subjective programmer judgments can inform the error rate, such as 
whether or not to give partial credit for a partial success,94 though in some 
contexts it is difficult to assess what should be considered a success or failure 
 
 87 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.  
 88 Tom Simonite, When It Comes to Gorillas, Google Photos Remains Blind, WIRED (Jan. 11, 2018, 7:00 
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/when-it-comes-to-gorillas-google-photos-remains-blind/ 
(“In 2015, a black software developer embarrassed Google by tweeting that the company’s Photos 
service had labeled photos of him with a black friend as ‘gorillas.’”).  
 89 See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 12. (“[D]eep learning dates back to the 1940s.”). 
 90 Id. at 98–101.   
 91 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (stating in the case of a scientific technique the court should consider the 
potential rate of error).   
 92 See GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 102 (referring to the error rate value as “the expected 
0-1 loss”). 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. 
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in the first place.  For example, in a lip-reading algorithm, is an inelegant but 
understandable translation a success or a failure?  And if it is only a partial 
success, how partial is it?  The answer, which will inform the error rates, is 
ultimately a human judgment, and there may be no consistency from one 
programmer to another.  For purely binary outcomes, like the task of 
identifying a defendant, no such thing as partial success would exist, because 
the individual the algorithm is identifying in a video, photo, or recording 
either is the defendant or is not.  
Additionally, a machine’s overall stated error rate may mask a higher rate 
of error when it draws conclusions about a defendant who does not share 
characteristics with the initial training data.  For instance, an error rate for a 
machine that has been trained on racially diverse data may be less reliable 
for a single racial category than others.  In one facial recognition application, 
“the software is right 99 percent of the time” but only “[w]hen the person in 
the photo is a white man.”95  “But the darker the skin, the more errors arise—
up to nearly 35 percent for images of darker skinned women.”96  Yet, 
oftentimes today’s machines are not trained on racially diverse data, which 
presents other problems for how to generalize its conclusions.  For instance, 
one recent facial recognition system reported 97.35% accuracy but on a 
dataset that turned out to be 77.5% male and 83.5% white.97  Its error rates 
were never broken down by race or gender.98  
Aurally, too, machines struggle with accents that are not standard 
American or British.  Speech recognition algorithms may vary in their 
accuracy when dealing with accents from various regions.  Scottish was the 
most difficult for one speech recognition algorithm to understand, followed 
closely by American southerners from Georgia.99  Nor are these variables 
entirely independent.  Sometimes the accuracy of a speech recognition 
algorithm is highly correlated with race, gender, or age: “higher-pitched 
voices are more difficult for speech-recognition systems” which makes them 
 
 95 Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, If You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-
intelligence.html?smid=fb-nytimes&smtyp=cur. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender 
Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 3 (2018) (citing Hu Han & Anil K. Jain, Age, 
Gender and Race Estimation from Unconstrained Face Images, MSU TECH. REP.  1, 2 (2014)).  
 98 Id. at 3 (citing Yaniv Taigman et al., Deepface:  Closing the Gap to Human-level Performance in Face 
Verification, 2014 IEEE CONF. COMPUTER VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION 1701, 1701). 
 99 Johnson, In the World of Voice-recognition, Not All Accents Are Equal, ECONOMIST (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21737017-you-can-train-your-gadgets-
understand-what-youre-saying-world (“The automatic captioning did worst with the Scottish 
speakers, transcribing more than half of the words incorrectly, followed closely by American 
southerners (from Georgia).”).  
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less accurate overall for women and especially children.100  Multiple popular 
speech recognition algorithms had similar trouble with black and mixed-race 
speakers.101  
Thus, the mosaic of different possible error rates presents a more 
complicated picture than a single, impressively low error rate may reflect.  
For this reason, machine learning evidence is particularly susceptible to 
violating Rule 702(d)’s requirement that the evidence be “reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”102  If an algorithm has an 
impressive rate of error with respect to data that bears little resemblance to 
the instant defendant, then its conclusions are not being reliably applied to 
the facts of the case.103  
B.  Problems of Data  
Rule 702 requires that the proffered evidence be based on sufficient facts 
or data and be the product of reliable principles and methods.104 This section 
suggests several inquiries of data collection and use that may affect the 
admissibility of machine learning output under 702(b) and 702(c).  
1.  How Large Was the Training Dataset?  
Sample size is an initial inquiry that is by no means unknown to lawyers 
challenging scientific evidence.105  Machine learning algorithms require very 
large datasets to extract useful patterns and make accurate assessments, and 
more complicated tasks require more examples to fine tune their accuracy.  
For instance, text recognition (a relatively simple task) may require only a few 
thousand examples, whereas language translation (an extremely complex 
task) requires tens of millions of examples.106  The party seeking to admit the 
evidence would want assurances that the training data is sufficiently large for 
the given task, whereas the party seeking to exclude the evidence would want 
 
 100 Id. (“It also did worse with women: higher-pitched voices are more difficult for speech-recognition 
systems, one reason they tend to struggle with children.”). 
 101 Id. (“In a follow-up experiment, Ms. Tatman used both YouTube and Bing Speech, made by 
Microsoft, to test only American accents.  Both found black and mixed-race speakers harder to 
comprehend than white ones.”). 
 102 FED. R. EVID. 702(d). 
 103 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“A court may conclude that there is simply too 
great an analytical gap between the data and the [expert] opinion proffered.”). 
 104 FED. R. EVID. 702(b)–(c). 
 105 See FED. JUD. CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 246 (3d ed. 2011) (pondering 
the question of how large a sample size should be when lawyers are making scientific inquiries).   
 106 See Wu et al., supra note 55 (teaching a machine English to French translation using thirty-six million 
pairs of sentences). 
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to inquire as to how many examples the algorithm has learned and if that 
number is in keeping with what is generally accepted for the task. 
2.  Were the Training Data Gathered or Generated in Ways that Produced a Biased 
Sample?  
Not only must the dataset be large, but it also must have some baseline 
quality to make useful predictions.  The quality of the data, and the extent to 
which it may be biased in a particular way, can be probed with various 
inquiries.  Where did the data come from?  Did the researcher him-or-herself 
gather the data according to accepted methods?  If the researcher instead 
received the data from a third party, can he or she vouch for its quality in 
any specific way?  In the case of open source methods107 or crowdsourced108 
data, which are common in the machine learning field, is such verification 
even possible?  
Courts are already familiar with challenges to data collection methods, 
and evaluating whether they produced a biased sample that would reduce 
the data’s relevancy to the present issue.  In the case of machine learning, the 
representativeness of the dataset to the given defendant’s jurisdiction, crime, 
or any other feature is crucial for drawing appropriate conclusions from the 
machine’s output.  This inquiry has obvious implications for a potential 
Equal Protection challenge,109 but even assuming there are no cognizable 
constitutional issues with the data, the data simply may not be relevant to a 
given defendant for any number of reasons.  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Loomis110 demonstrates how 
these bias and relevancy concerns are already manifesting in algorithmic 
output based on data.  In challenging the State’s use of Correctional 
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (“COMPAS”) to 
determine his sentence, Loomis’s expert testified that sentencing courts have 
little assurance that the data COMPAS uses are unbiased, or were even 
 
 107 “Open source software is software with source code that anyone can inspect, modify, and enhance.” 
What Is Open Source?, OPEN SOURCE,  https://opensource.com/resources/what-open-source (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
 108 “Crowdsourcing is a type of participative online activity in which an individual, organization, or 
company with enough means proposes to a group of individuals of varying knowledge, 
heterogeneity, and number, via a flexible open call, the voluntary undertaking of a task.”  Enrique 
Estellés Arolas & Fernando González Ladrón-de-Guevara, Towards an Integrating Crowdsourcing 
Definition, 38 J. INFO. SCI. 1, 11 (2011).  
 109 The extent to which machine learning evidence might be sufficiently biased in a way that is adverse 
to minority groups to mount a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment challenge is outside the scope of 
this Comment, but it is a critical question ripe for further research.  
 110 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016) (noting that the risk-need assessment tool name COMPAS does 
not predict the specific likelihood that an individual offender will reoffend).  
 
Feb. 2019] MACHINE LEARNING EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT 937 
 
relevant to Loomis: 
The Court does not know how the COMPAS compares that individual’s 
history with the population that it’s comparing them with.  The Court 
doesn’t even know whether that population is a Wisconsin population, a 
New York population, a California population. . . . There’s all kinds of 
information that the court doesn’t have, and what we’re doing is we’re mis-
informing the court when we put these graphs in front of them and let them 
use it for sentence.111   
Similar questions would be appropriate when probing a machine 
learning dataset’s relevancy.  If a machine learning algorithm is generating 
inculpatory evidence for a Wisconsin defendant, should the data only come 
from the Wisconsin population, or the Midwest region, or can nationwide 
data suffice?  Geography would not be the only consideration, as other 
factors could bias the data.  The answers to these questions are intensely fact-
specific and would depend on what the proponent of the machine learning 
evidence is trying to prove. 
Moreover, even if the prosecution relies on official statistics gathered by 
government agencies, these datasets are not inherently high quality.  Today, 
the accuracy of government databases is often accepted “as an article of faith, 
with courts according them a presumption of reliability.”112  While data-
driven governance is often a laudable goal, “[t]oday, the prevailing zeitgeist 
of governments is one of database expansion, not quality control or 
accountability, and a blasé acceptance of data error and its negative 
consequences for individuals.”113  Some important figures have taken note.  
In Herring v. United States, Justice Ginsburg recognized in her dissent that 
“[t]he risk of error stemming from these databases is not slim,” noting issues 
with National Crime Information Center, terror watch lists, and public 
employment databases.114  
Professors Logan and Ferguson note the series of challenges and pitfalls 
that accompany government database creation.  When data are first 
gathered or generated, basic human error in collection or interpretation is 
common.115  Sometimes data are collected and uploaded without legal 
authorization or counter to what was initially ordered.116  Once errors are 
 
 111 Id. at 756–57 (quoting the testimony of Loomis’s expert). 
 112 Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
541, 543–44 (2016).  
 113 Id. at 543.  
 114 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 115 Logan & Ferguson, supra note 112, at 559 (“At the point of [data] collection, accuracy can be 
impaired by basic human error.”).  
 116 Id. (noting that states often upload DNA profiles not authorized by the law and DNA information 
that should be destroyed is often retained). 
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made, they are difficult to discover and difficult to correct.117  If the error is 
corrected in one database, it is not guaranteed that the correction will filter 
to the myriad of other databases that had, in the past, copied from the initial 
database.118  Of course, in a federalist system with hyperlocalist police power, 
uniform data collection, management, correction, and dissemination would 
be as difficult to implement as it would be helpful.119 
3.  Was the Data Manipulated?  If So, How, and Does that Matter? 
When a dataset is not large enough, programmers have several 
techniques for manipulating it to artificially create a larger training set.  For 
example, the algorithm may take many random samples from the original 
dataset to create many other, smaller datasets.120  The programmer may also 
intentionally distort the examples, such as by warping images or adding 
random noise.121  The forms of manipulation are largely influenced by 
subjective programmer judgment and norms in the field. 
4.  How Was the Data Tagged and Labeled?  
Moreover, even if a large dataset is collected or generated using standard 
techniques, it must be labeled and organized properly, which, for datasets 
with millions of examples, is a menial but crucial task.  Machine learning 
programs only “learn” what they are “taught” from the data, and it is the 
programmers who make judgments about what the data show by the way 
that they are labeled.  Indeed, researchers can intentionally teach the 
algorithm nonsense simply by labeling.122  In that way, who labeled the data 
and how—and the extent to which the labeling was done properly—are  
 
 117 Id. at 586 (“Ex ante detection of database error, as Professor Kenneth Karst noted fifty years ago, 
‘depends on the subject’s access to his own file and his awareness of the need to inspect it.  Even 
when a record is freely accessible to its subject, there is no assurance that the subject will know of 
its existence or its contents.’” (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls over the Accuracy 
and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAW  & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 358 (1966)). 
 118 Id. at 588 (“Data is often shared, replicated, backed up and stored in many different databases at 
once.  Even if a data error is corrected, this does not guarantee that other shared datasets will reflect 
the change.”). 
 119 Id. at 596–611 (suggesting legislation, regulation, and best practices to coordinate data at the 
federal, state, and local levels). 
 120 GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 52, at 120 (discussing the most common method, the k-fold cross-
validation procedure).  
 121 See Ritchie Ng, Machine Learning Photo OCR, RITCHIENG.COM http://www.ritchieng.com/ 
machine-learning-photo-ocr/ (last updated Oct. 13, 2018) (noting the possibility of distorting 
examples through “warping the image”). 
 122 See 3Blue1Brown, Gradient Descent, How Neural Networks Learn | 2, Deep Learning, Chapter 2, YOUTUBE 
(OCT. 16, 2017), at 18:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHZwWFHWa-w (teaching an 
algorithm that an image of Isaac Newton is an image of a cow).  
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critical inquiries.  
While the researcher may do the labeling herself, it is unlikely that she is 
labeling millions of examples by hand.  Often researchers use open datasets 
already created for public use, but the researcher may have no idea how that 
data set was created and labeled.123  Strangers sitting at home may do it for 
nominal payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.124  And, if one machine 
learning algorithm can label data,125 other machine learning algorithms can 
then use that labeled data to learn other tasks, which can clearly have the 
advantage of labeling quickly but would only further compound the potential 
risks by adding one machine learning process on top of another.126 
C.  Problems in the Source Code 
An examination of software’s source code may also bring to light details 
that affect the admissibility of the evidence under Rule 702.  If the 
programming itself contains errors, then it is possible that the program’s 
conclusions are not the “product of reliable principles and methods.”127  
Broadly speaking, “source code” is a combination of words and 
mathematical symbols that have a particular meaning in a programming 
language.128  Unlike “machine code,” which is a binary collection of 1’s and 
 
 123 Hector Garcia-Molina et al., Challenges in Data Crowdsourcing, 28 IEEE TRANSACTIONS 
KNOWLEDGE & DATA ENGINEERING 901, 905–07 (discussing problems with crowdsourced data).  
 124 See Ng, supra note 121 (“Hire people on the web to label data (amazon mechanical turk).”). 
 125 Tom Simonite, Google’s Brain-Inspired Software Describes What It Sees in Complex Images, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/532666/googles-brain-inspired-
software-describes-what-it-sees-in-complex-images/ (“Researchers at Google have created 
software that can use complete sentences to accurately describe scenes shown in photos . . . .”). 
 126 Linking machine learning applications in this way is increasingly common.  One University of 
California, Berkeley researcher has developed a dual machine learning system in which one 
algorithm identifies the species of bird in a photograph, while a second algorithm analyzes the 
decision-making of the first and creates, in sentence format, explanations of how the first algorithm 
made its species determination.  See For Artificial Intelligence to Thrive, It Must Explain Itself, ECONOMIST 
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21737018-if-it-
cannot-who-will-trust-it-artificial-intelligence-thrive-it-must (discussing the pros and cons of “deep 
learning” in artificial intelligence).  Google’s AutoML project is actively researching machine 
learning algorithms that can themselves write new machine learning algorithms.  See Cade Metz, 
Building A.I. that Can Build A.I., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/ 
05/technology/machine-learning-artificial-intelligence-ai.html?_r=0 (discussing Google’s search 
for artificial intelligence that can effectively build other A.I.-reliant mechanisms in the absence of 
human A.I. experts).  
 127 FED. R. EVID. 702(b). 
 128 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the Growing Controversy over the Reliability of 
Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 104 (2016) (“The source code itself is a 
combination of words and mathematical symbols that have a particular meaning in the selected 
language.”). 
 
940 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:3 
 
0’s, the source code is human readable,129 and is likely to be intelligible to a 
defense expert.130  Source code dictates which tasks a computer program 
performs, how the program performs the tasks, and the sequence in which 
the program performs the tasks.131  The source code can provide uninhibited 
access to the exact ways the programmer decided the machine will operate 
and is much more informative than simply observing what goes in and what 
comes out.132  
Crucially, the source code can reveal simple errors or faulty assumptions 
in the program’s creation.  In a given program, millions of lines of code—
often pieced together from innumerable sources and developers—give rise to 
simple accidents in transcription, mistakes in conditional programming, 
software rot,133 or faulty updates to legacy code.134  When one programmer 
designs the initial version of a program, it may be difficult for subsequent 
programmers in later versions to work around or adapt to the personal style 
and conventions of the first.135  Studies demonstrate that, as a result, error 
rates of one percent in code are common, which can correspond to tens of 
thousands of errors in a single program.136  
Moreover, sometimes the software itself contains no errors in the 
programming, but, because of human errors in communication or 
misunderstanding, the program does not accomplish the task that was 
ultimately sought.137  When the device uses several different scientific 
disciplines—like, for example, the way a breathalyzer must incorporate 
knowledge from programming, chemistry, and biology—differences in 
 
 129 Id. at 105. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 103. 
 132 Chessman, supra note 19, at 182 (“While some information can be gleaned from viewing the 
program in action, this information is highly limited and may omit crucial details that relate to the 
reliability and accuracy of the program’s output.”). 
 133 Id. at 190 (“‘Software rot’ [happens] where the quality, functionality, and usefulness of a program 
actually degrade over time. . . . [It] occurs for a variety of reasons.  At the most basic level, each 
software update creates new interactions between different portions of the source code, which may 
also entail unforeseen interactions and unforeseen consequences.”). 
 134 Id. at 186–92.  
 135 Id. at 186 n.32 (“Subjective expressiveness is so pronounced that computer code is actually expressively 
distinguishable—it is possible ‘to recognize the author of a given program based on programming 
style’ in the same way one might identify Nietzsche by his obscurity or Hemingway by his verbosity.” 
(quoting Jane Huffman Hayes & Jeff Offutt, Recognizing Authors: An Examination of the Consistent Programmer 
Hypothesis, 20 J. SOFTWARE TESTING VERIFICATION & RELIABILITY 329 (2010))).  
 136 Id. at 186–87. 
 137 Id. at 188. (“Even a programmer who makes no technical coding errors will produce inaccurate 
software if the programmer misunderstands the nature or requirements of the job.  For example, a 
human programmer may misunderstand the program requirements because of miscommunication, 
misunderstanding, or accidental omission of important details during instruction.”). 
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understanding can give rise to methodological errors that do not come to 
light until even after product launch.138  In that case, the programming itself 
could be flawless, yet the machine would still be unreliable.  
These issues have come to light in only the few cases where state supreme 
courts ordered comprehensive inspection into the reliability of certain 
devices.  In a Minnesota inquiry into the Intoxilyzer 5000EN, a breathalyzer 
device, several reliability issues were uncovered with an examination of the 
source code.  Specifically, it was discovered that the device “has a margin of 
error, that radio frequencies from cell phones can disturb the accuracy of the 
test, and that the test may erroneously produce a deficient sample.”139  
Similarly, in New Jersey, a Special Master was appointed to evaluate the 
source code of the State’s widely used breathalyzer device, the Alcotest 7110 
MKIII–C.140  While the device was ultimately found to be reliable in most 
cases, the Special Master uncovered several problems with how the device 
functioned in certain situations, such as when testing the blood alcohol 
content of women over sixty141 in addition to other issues, like a need for a 
corrective multiplier for some temperature readings.142  Importantly, none of 
these errors or considerations would have come to the attention of the court 
without examination of the source code.  
Even while these issues present themselves in the context of traditional, 
non-machine learning software, there is little reason to think that machine 
learning program development is immune from human misunderstanding, 
slips of the finger in transcription, faulty assumptions, or biases.  It is true that 
machine learning algorithms work differently than programs of the past, with 
bigger sets of data, more processing power, and a different methodology.  
However, they are still created according to the ways that all software is 
created: as a product of human decision making, with lines of code running 
in conjunction with other software, and on hardware that degrades with time.  
D.  Trade Secret Protections  
As a result of the considerations above, lawyers will have a profound 
interest in examining the underlying data and source code of machine 
learning software for such errors—and yet, standing in their way will be trade 
secret protections and reluctance of courts to compel discovery into these 
 
 138 See id. at 188 n.48 (explaining how programmers of a breathalyzer used an incorrect conversion 
factor that was not discovered until examination of the source code).   
 139 In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 525, 545 (Minn. 
2012).  
 140 State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 120 (N.J. 2008). 
 141 Id. at 140. 
 142 Id. at 145.  
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possible defenses.  Tech firms are particularly concerned with protecting 
trade secrets in machine learning because the field is still in its infancy, 
meaning that established players have less advantage over competitive 
startups than in other areas they typically dominate, like search in the case 
of Google or social media in the case of Facebook.143  Today, in non-machine 
learning software, parties cannot observe the critical details of how the 
program was constructed because of its proprietary nature, and the 
programming firms themselves are often reluctant to reveal the source code 
or data that form the basis of their business success.144  
A trade secret is nonpublic information that is the subject of reasonable 
efforts to maintain its secrecy and that confers a business advantage over 
competitors who lack that information.145  Both data and source code have 
consistently been held to be trade secrets, and thus courts have often been 
reluctant to compel discovery into either, even for defendants in criminal 
actions who could use the information to mount a meaningful defense.  
Defendants and third-party developers are increasingly disputing the 
discoverability and trade secret protections with respect to discovery of non-
machine learning software, yet rarely is the source code turned over for 
inspection.146  For instance, the two technologies that have so far experienced 
the most litigation over discovery of source code are infrared breath testing 
devices (i.e., breathalyzers) and DNA probabilistic genotyping, mostly 
surrounding the popular software TrueAllele.147  In the breathalyzer cases, 
“the clear majority of courts rejected defendants’ requests that a defense 
expert be granted access to the program’s source code.”148  Likewise, in the 
TrueAllele cases, “although the issue has been litigated in at least seven states, 
no state court has ordered discovery of the TrueAllele source code” due to 
trade secret protections.149 
 
 143 See Battle of the Brains, ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2017, at 61, 62 (discussing how tech giants are investing 
large sums to develop their AI capabilities).  
 144 Chartes Tait Graves & Brian D. Range, Identification of Trade Secrets Claims in Litigation: Solutions for a 
Ubiquitous Dispute, 5 NW. J. TECH & INTELL. PROP. 68, 85–86 (2006) (describing the typicality of 
plaintiff corporations resisting to specifically disclose trade secret details in litigation, including 
research and development details and business strategies). 
 145 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2012) (defining “trade secret”); Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 
790 F.2d 1195, 1199–1203 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining the requirements of a protected trade secret).  
 146 Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 100. 
 147 Id.  
 148 Id. (citing State v. Underdahl, 749 N.W.2d 117, 120–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009) (affirming the district court’s denial of production of computer 
code); People v. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681–82 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2007); State v. Burnell, No. 
MV06479034S, 2007 WL 241230, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007); State v. Walters, No. 
DBDMV050340997S, 2006 WL 785393, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006); Moe v. State, 944 
So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 149 Imwinkelried, supra note 128 at 111. 
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Undoubtedly, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting trade secrets 
not only for developers’ economic protection, but also to ensure society reaps 
the benefit of continued innovation.  Trade secrets are protected in federal 
and state statutes, as well as incorporated into Rule 501’s evolving common 
law of privileges.150  And yet, under statute and at common law, it is well-
settled that the trade secret privilege is a conditional or qualified one.151  The 
trade secrets protections of every state include some form of an “injustice 
exception” that allows for discovery.  “While the precise wording varies from 
state to state, the injustice exceptions substantially suggest that trade secret 
privilege from discovery exists only ‘if the allowance of the privilege will not 
tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.’”152 
Thus, courts have a number of tools at their disposal to not only allow 
source code discovery in the first place (permission by statute or Rule 501), 
but also to protect the legitimate economic interests of developers.  Once 
discovery is compelled, courts have several safeguards to protect developers’ 
business interest: courts can conduct in camera review, issue protective 
orders, seal records, threaten sanctions for improper disclosure, or require 
the parties to mutually agree on a third-party to review the source code.153  
Unfortunately, courts rarely use these tools and instead typically deny 
discovery altogether.154 
The California Court of Appeals, reasoning in People v. Superior Court 
(Chubbs), typifies how courts often hold that discovery of the source code itself 
requires meeting a high burden that the source code will assist the defense 
where no other unprotected information will.  In that case, Martell Chubbs 
was charged with murder on the basis of a DNA result that would on average 
match randomly 1 in 10,000 times.155  At trial, however, the prosecution put 
forward a different analysis that put the match as randomly occurring on 
 
 150 Id. at 125 (“Although Congress balked at enacting the draft rule, many states have done so; 
regardless, the federal courts have recognized the privilege by common-law process under Federal 
Rule 501.”).  
 151 Id. at 126. 
 152 Chessman, supra note 19, at 212 (quoting JEROME G. SNIDER ET AL., CORPORATE PRIVILEGES 
AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION § 8.02[1] (2011)).  
 153 See id. at 213.  Many other forms of protection are also possible. In civil cases, courts have issue the 
following protective orders, inter alia: The opposing party’s experts could examine the trade secret 
information only in a secure room; to gain access to the secure room, the experts had to identify 
themselves by iris and palm-print scans; during their examination of the information, the experts 
had to use paper bearing tags emitting radio waves to determine how many pages of notes the 
experts had used; counsel and the experts had to sign declarations that they would access the data 
only for use in the present litigation; and the trial courtroom would be closed to the public during 
any testimony discussing the trade secret information.  Id. 
 154 Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 126–27. 
 155 People v. Superior Court, No. B258569, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015). 
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average 1 in 1.62 quintillion times.156  Chubbs sought the source code of the 
subsequent program to account for the discrepancy and examine the 
assumptions built into the software.  
The Court of Appeals held that source code is a trade secret and that it 
could be discoverable only by making “a prima facie, particularized 
showing” that the source code would be relevant and necessary to a 
defense.157   The court concluded that Chubbs had not met that burden.  The 
court reasoned that Chubbs had already received extensive information 
regarding the program’s methodology and underlying assumptions from 
materials other than the source code.158  Unfortunately, the appellate court 
did not explain how Chubbs could make the particularized showing it 
demanded or what would constitute sufficient particularity to overcome the 
trade secret protection.159 
V.  ADMISSIBILITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION  
Several constitutional provisions may be implicated by machine learning 
identification in criminal prosecutions.  Defendants may cite the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause160 or the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause.161  Some will likely provide little protection to 
 
 156 Id. at 3–4.  
 157 Id. at 10. 
 158 Id. at 21.  This argument, that the defendant’s access to other records, checklists for operation, and 
use manuals is sufficient to challenge the evidentiary weight of the device, is a common refrain in 
the courts.  However, Professor Imwinkelreid argues these types of records are not nearly as 
informative as the source code.  Commenting on similar reasoning of the Court in People v. 
Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), Professor Imwinkelreid argues: 
  Those records do not contain the same information that an examination of the software’s 
source code would yield.  The analyst’s checklist might minimize the risk of human error 
in conducting a test at a specific time and place, but the checklist provides no insight into 
any inherent defects in the program logic.  Likewise, maintenance records could prove that 
for a certain period after a maintenance the device was operating as intended; but again, 
even if the device was operating as intended, there might be a defect buried in the source 
code.  In sum, the discoverability of those documents does not undercut the case for 
discovery of the source code.  
  Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 120. 
 159 Chessman, supra note 19, at 199 (“The appellate court did not explain how Mr. Chubbs could make 
the particularized showing it demanded without access to the source code, nor did it identify what 
showings would constitute sufficient particularity.”).  
 160 The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, and the Supreme Court’s relevant 
jurisprudence, almost surely would allow prosecutors to require suspects to have recordings of their 
voice, images of their face, or other identifiers to be collected and fed into a machine learning 
algorithm, and hence this issue is not extensively discussed in this Comment.  In short, because 
Schmerber v. California holds that only “testimony” may not be compelled under the Fifth 
Amendment, the state may compel physical evidence and identifiers that could be fed into the 
algorithm.  384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
 161 There is much to explore with machine learning in the Fourth Amendment context that is mostly 
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defendants who wish to exclude inculpatory machine learning evidence, such 
as the Fifth Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment, meanwhile, will almost 
surely require the evidence to admitted in the form of expert testimony but 
will not bar it entirely.  
A.  Due Process Under the Fifth Amendment  
Machine learning output is often inexplicable, and experts sometimes 
cannot explain how the machine came to a particular conclusion.162  On this 
basis, defendants may argue that such “guilt by black box” violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause163 because, arguendo, “it offends some 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental.”164  This “fundamental principle” may be 
that the inculpatory evidence must have some kind of discernible logic, 
explanation, ability to be examined or challenged.  However, defendants 
making this argument will have little chance of success, at least as free-
standing due process precedent currently exists.  
Two background norms govern the Supreme Court’s consideration of 
free-standing due process.  First, where all the specific guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights have been observed and a guilty verdict has been reached, the 
Court typically finds that the defendant has thus enjoyed “all the process that 
is due.”165  “Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual 
 
outside the scope of this Comment.  See generally Melanie Reid, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment in the 
Age of Supercomputers, Artificial Intelligence, and Robots, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 863 (2017) (offering a new 
perspective on Fourth Amendment protections in the age of machine learning).  However, there 
may be conceivable instances where a defendant would try to cite the Fourth Amendment as a bar 
to inculpatory evidence derived from machine learning processes.  For example, to echo the facts 
of Maryland v. King, an individual may be arrested for one crime and have his photo taken, voice 
recorded, or cheek swabbed to gather data that would be fed into a machine learning algorithm, 
which could then identify and tie the arrestee to past unsolved crimes.  569 U.S. 435, 441 (2013).  
The Supreme Court held in King that a very similar situation was undoubtedly a search, and indeed 
one performed without individualized suspicion.  Id. at 446, 448.  But the Court ultimately held 
that it did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the state’s interest in identifying perpetrators 
of past crimes outweighed the relatively non-invasive nature of a cheek swab for an arrestee.  Id. at 
453.  Indeed, the mere photographic identification that would likely be employed in at least some 
machine learning analysis is undoubtedly even less invasive than that.  “[W]e have never held that 
merely taking a person’s photograph invades any recognized ‘expectation of privacy.’” Id. at 477 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).  Thus, defendants would 
likely find little help in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to exclude machine learning 
evidence procured and used in this way.  
 162 For a more detailed look at explainability problems in machine learning, see infra Section VI.C.  
 163 “No person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V.  
 164 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992).   
 165 Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2005) 
(“Although the Due Process Clause provides a general baseline of fundamental fairness in the 
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source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government 
behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive 
due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’”166  Second, 
beyond enumerated protections in the Bill of Rights, whatever remaining 
protections are afforded by the free-standing Due Process Clause are “to be 
construed narrowly,” and the Court has consistently declined to expand its 
scope, especially when doing so would interfere with the law enforcement 
powers of the states.167  
No specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights regulates the admissibility of 
evidence, but the Due Process Clause does in very limited circumstances.168  
The Court currently recognizes only two forms of “bad evidence” that 
“invalidate the defendant’s conviction on due process grounds.”169  One is 
“government-induced perjury”170 and the other is “identification testimony 
from a suggestive lineup.”171  “Admission of such evidence, in the Court’s 
view, is fundamentally unfair and violates due process.”172  This analysis, 
however, only demonstrates that free standing due process is the proper 
inquiry to evaluate evidence; once the Court is operating within that 
doctrine, defense counsel would face severe headwinds in trying to establish 
a free standing due process right to exclude machine learning evidence.  
To do so, the defendant would have to show that machine learning 
evidence “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”173  The inquiry of 
 
criminal process, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where a more specific provision of 
the Bill of Rights applies, that provision constitutes all the process that is due.”); see also Jerold H. 
Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 
45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 399 (2001) (“The range of regulation imposed under free-standing due 
process could also be restricted by giving a preemptive impact to the incorporated specific 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”).  
 166 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). 
 167 Israel, supra note 165, at 387 (“The Court’s decisions in the post-incorporation era have, indeed, 
considered several major reformulations of due process doctrine as applied to criminal procedure, 
with some accepted and some rejected.  The most important of these involved: (1) characterizing 
free-standing due process as a disfavored concept to be construed narrowly . . . .”).  But see id. at 
389–97 (questioning how truly “limited” free standing due process is by listing the “extraordinary 
range” of approximately fifty-one different due process protections the Court has found throughout 
the typical criminal adjudication timeline).  
 168 Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65, 86 (2008) (“The Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments provides the framework for testing evidence rules for 
constitutionality.”). 
 169 Id. at 88 (“Today’s constitutional doctrine holds that bad evidence may invalidate the defendant’s 
conviction on due process grounds.”). 
 170 Id. at 89 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110, 112–13 (1935)).   
 171 Id. (citing Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 441, 442–43 (1969)).   
 172 Id.  
 173 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992). 
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what is “ranked as fundamental” is hardly scientific.  Courts must “test the 
fundamental nature of a right within the context of that common law system of 
justice, rather than against some hypothesized ‘civilized system’ or some 
foreign system growing out of different traditions.”174  Thus, a right is 
fundamental if it “is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered 
liberty.”175 
 A defendant’s most apparent argument would be, first, as a threshold 
matter, that the common law tradition has always required evidence that is 
explainable, bears discernible logic, and may be examined or challenged; 
and second, that machine learning evidence does not fit that mold because 
oftentimes experts cannot discern how the machine made a particular 
determination.  Unfortunately, a defendant would have difficulty 
demonstrating a long-established recognition at common law that evidence 
must be fully explainable.  Then, even if the Court recognized such a view, it 
is not clear machine learning evidence would meet that definition, as its 
processes, methodology, data, and assumptions can, if not fully, be mostly 
explained and understood.  Machine learning does have logical, scientific, 
and mathematical principles; and while it does make errors, such rates of 
error are knowable.176  Moreover, machine learning output would likely be 
introduced in the form of expert testimony,177 meaning the defendant would 
have the opportunity to cross-examine an expert on the machine’s 
capabilities and processes.  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Loomis examined an issue that bears 
some resemblance to the above due process inquiry, though different from 
the issue of substantive evidence at trial.  After pleading guilty to several 
offenses related to a drive-by shooting, Loomis appeared for his sentencing 
hearing,178 and in determining his sentence, the court relied on a report 
generated by COMPAS, one of the most popular risk assessment tools in the 
United States.179  
Loomis challenged his sentencing determination in part on due process 
grounds, arguing that he and the sentencing judge knew little about how the 
algorithm worked or the extent to which it relied on his gender in making a 
risk estimation.180  In essence, he argued, it was black-box sentencing, thus 
 
 174 Israel, supra note 165, at 384 (emphasis added).  
 175 Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)). 
 176 For discussions of machine learning and error rates, see supra Parts III and & IV.  
 177 See supra Part IV.  
 178 State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016). 
 179 Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing (“Northpointe’s software is among 
the most widely used assessment tools in the country.”). 
 180 Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 765 (“Loomis asserts that because COMPAS risk scores take gender into 
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offending his due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate 
information.181  The court conceded that, due to trade secret protections, 
neither it nor the parties understood fully how the algorithm worked or the 
extent to which gender was a factor.182  Yet the court ultimately decided that 
because Loomis could challenge the inputs and outputs of the algorithm—
that is, the data that went in and the conclusions drawn from it—he had 
sufficient basis to challenge the algorithm even without knowing the extent 
of its internal processes,183 and thus he enjoyed due process.  As for the use 
of gender, the court concluded that the use of gender worked to promote the 
accuracy of the algorithm’s conclusions, which satisfied due process.184  
Again, Loomis is instructive insofar as the Wisconsin Supreme Court was 
evaluating due process rights in the context of unknown algorithmic 
processes, but it was not a case of machine learning or evidence at trial.  Even 
so, Loomis shows courts’ reluctance to find new due process rights in black 
box, algorithmic evidence.  When machine learning evidence is used at trial 
to help prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, courts may echo the Loomis 
decision and similarly find due process satisfied when (1) the defendant can 
at least challenge the data that go into the algorithm (a requirement that can 
be addressed with procedural rules and discovery wholly within the Court’s 
control) and (2) the algorithm possesses some sufficient level of accuracy, 
which can come to light at a Daubert hearing on admissibility on cross-





account, a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment violates a defendant’s due 
process right not to be sentenced on the basis of gender.”).  
 181 Id. at 760 (“It is well-established that a defendant has a constitutionally protected due process right 
to be sentenced upon accurate information.” (internal citations omitted)).  See also id. (“The plurality 
opinion [in Gardner] concluded that the defendant ‘was denied due process of law when the death 
sentence was imposed, at least in part, on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to 
deny or explain.’” (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 351 (1977))). 
 182 Id. at 761 (“Northpointe, Inc., the developer of COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary 
instrument and a trade secret.  Accordingly, it does not disclose how the risk scores are determined 
or how the factors are weighed.”).  
 183 Id. at 761–62 (“Loomis had an opportunity to challenge his risk scores by arguing that other factors 
or information demonstrate their inaccuracy.”). 
 184 Id. at 766 (“Likewise, there is a factual basis underlying COMPAS’s use of gender in calculating 
risk scores.  Instead, it appears that any risk assessment tool which fails to differentiate between men 
and woman will misclassify both genders.”).  
 
Feb. 2019] MACHINE LEARNING EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT 949 
 
B.  Confrontation Under the Sixth Amendment  
When the prosecution seeks to admit machine learning evidence, it is 
likely that the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause would require an 
expert to testify in-person and be subject to cross examination.185  
Analogously, when other forms of machine evidence have been used in 
prosecution, the Supreme Court has held that, under the Sixth Amendment, 
the results may not be admitted without an expert subject to cross 
examination.  
Indeed, the manner in which the Sixth Amendment requires expert 
witnesses to testify on drug analysis evidence may provide a framework for how 
machine learning experts would be required to testify in prosecutions.186  
Similar to how lab scientists are required to testify in-person and be subject to 
cross examination, it is likely that a machine learning expert would also have to 
appear in person to admit inculpatory machine learning output into evidence. 
VI.  THE WEIGHT OF UNEXPLAINABLE MACHINE LEARNING EVIDENCE 
Parts IV and V establish that there is nothing inherently inadmissible 
about machine learning evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
Fifth Amendment, or the Sixth Amendment.  Yet, assuming the machine 
learning evidence is admissible, “there can be significant remaining questions 
about the weight and believability of the evidence.”187  Indeed, when judges 
rule on the admissibility of scientific evidence, they are expressly playing the 
role of gatekeeper and rejecting only evidence that is not the product of 
reliable principles and methods.188  Rejecting scientific evidence seems to be 
exception rather than the norm, in keeping with the Supreme Court’s 
observation that the Federal Rules of Evidence are construed to be liberal 
and permissive.189  In fact, Professors Helland and Klick conclude “there is 
virtually no systematic evidence supporting the view that adoption of Daubert 
 
 185 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).   
 186 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 316–18 (2009) (reasoning that any perceived 
objectivity in scientific evidence does not render it immune from the Confrontation Clause); see also 
Erick J. Poorbaugh, Note, Interfacing Your Accuser: Computerized Evidence and the Confrontation Clause 
Following Melendez-Diaz, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 213, 229 (2010) (“Although the Supreme Court 
in Melendez-Diaz stated that the ‘witnesses’ in that case were ‘the analysts,’ it did not specify which 
of the analysts must testify (or whether they all must testify).”). 
 187 Imwinkelried, supra note 128 at 118. 
 188 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (referring to a “gatekeeping 
role for the judge”).  
 189 See Imwinkelried, supra note 128, at 118 (“[T]he Court . . . characterized the general spirit of the 
Federal Rules as ‘liberal’ and ‘permissive.’).  
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makes any difference at all” in keeping “junk science” out of the 
courtroom.190  Thus, for the oft-admitted “shaky but admissible evidence,” 
as Justice Blackmun put it in Daubert, “[v]igorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of 
proof” are the principal tools for swaying the trier of fact.191  
For three reasons, these burdens for the counsel who aims to discount the 
persuasiveness of the “shaky but admissible evidence” are likely greater in 
the criminal context than in the civil liability context that Justice Blackmun 
was presiding over in Daubert.  First, as practitioners have observed, “the 
appellate courts appear to be more willing to second-guess trial court 
judgments on the admissibility of purported scientific evidence in civil cases 
than in criminal cases.”192  That is, courts seem to be less demanding or 
rigorous of scientific evidence in criminal cases, which, to the dissatisfaction 
of many, has often included “shaky” evidence like handwriting analysis, hair 
comparisons, fingerprint examinations, firearms identifications, bitemark 
analysis, and intoxication testing.193  Most challenges to admissibility of these 
types of evidence have been unsuccessful, even while exposing “the lack of 
empirical support for many commonly employed forensic techniques.”194  
Second, machines are often afforded a presumption of reliability that can 
make them unduly persuasive to a lay person.195  And third, once a trial court 
rules that evidence is admissible, the appellate courts are highly deferential 
to that decision, and only review under an abuse of discretion standard.  
Given that state of affairs, losing the admissibility battle puts considerable 
onus on trial counsel to persuade the trier of fact to discount the weight that 
the evidence should be assigned.  Jurors might be cautious to assign much 
weight to machine learning evidence because of its peculiar property that it 
is often not explainable.  
That is, even if one has cleared the above trade secret hurdles, probed 
the data, and examined the source code, often no one can explain how or 
why a machine learning algorithm reached a particular result, which may (or 
may not) significantly reduce the weight it is assigned by the trier of fact.  
Regardless of machine learning’s potential use in litigation specifically, this 
issue is severe because machine learning could be useful in many areas that 
 
 190 Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Does Anyone Get Stopped at the Gate?  An Empirical Assessment of the 
Daubert Trilogy in the States, 20 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 32 (2012). 
 191 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. 
 192 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD 11 (2009).  
 193 Id. at 94, 104, 107–08, 117–18.  
 194 1 COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 614 (6th ed. 2016).  
 195 Kroll et al., supra note 4, at 680 (“[D]ecisions made by computers may enjoy an undeserved 
assumption of fairness or objectivity.”). 
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require ex post rationale and explanation.196   Given the present state of the 
technology, it is foreseeable that when machine learning begins to produce 
substantive evidence in litigation, an expert witness on the stand—perhaps 
even the individual who created the machine learning algorithm at issue—
would not be explain how exactly it yielded the inculpatory results.  This 
unexplainability may even be machine learning’s most concerning feature to 
jurors and lead them to discount the weight it should be afforded.  
A.  Examples of Inexplicable Machine Learning 
To illustrate how this problem manifests, consider the earlier example of 
a programmer who is training a machine learning algorithm to recognize her 
mother’s face in photographs.197  As explained, the algorithm could be 
identifying the mother by means that humans do, such as recognizing the 
collection of features in the height and width of the face, shape of the head 
and hair, and so on.198  But sometimes the machine might establish 
correlations and rules that are not apparent at first glance or that humans 
would not use.  For instance, if the machine has only ever learned from 
images in which the mother was photographed with flash on, the machine 
may use the brightness of the image as a basis to identify the mother, and 
with more weight than any attribute about her face.199  If this were the case, 
when the machine later must confront an image of the mother in which she 
was not photographed with flash, the machine might not be able to identify 
her (a false negative), even though humans would not be confused by such a 
situation.  Conversely, the machine might mistakenly identify as the mother 
an entirely different woman who was photographed with flash (a false 
 
 196 These areas include, but are not limited to, national security.  See Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. Be Taught to 
Explain Itself?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/ 
can-ai-be-taught-to-explain-itself.html (quoting a national security analyst’s legal need for 
explainable AI decisions, “If I’m going to sign off on a decision, I need to be able to justify it.”).  
 197 For an initial discussion of this example, see supra Section II.B.  This particular example is 
hypothetical and is only offered to illustrate the general issue that machines can, and do, learn 
unforeseen rules.  It is not from a specific study.  
 198 See Murphy, supra note 56 (“The software extracts information from thousands of facial data points, 
including nose width, mustache shape, eyebrows, corners of the mouth, hairline and even aspects 
of the face we don’t have words for.  It then turns the faces into numbers.”).  
 199 Machine learning researchers are well aware of this issue and have confronted it in a variety of 
contexts:  
  Tomaso Poggio, the director of M.I.T.’s Center for Brains, Minds and Machines, offered 
a classic parable used to illustrate this disconnect.  The Army trained a program to 
differentiate American tanks from Russian tanks with 100 percent accuracy.  Only later 
did analysts realize that the American tanks had been photographed on a sunny day and 
the Russian tanks had been photographed on a cloudy day.  The computer had learned to 
detect brightness.  
  Id. 
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positive).  In such a scenario, the machine learned a correlation that was 
undoubtedly accurate within the universe of data it was initially shown, but 
not one that would be reliable for all varying situations.  This is a common 
problem with the rules that machines learn.200  
Whether the machine is deducing obvious rules (like facial attributes) or 
non-obvious and potentially unreliable rules (like brightness in an image) is 
impossible to predict ex ante and discovering what rules the machine has 
deduced sometimes requires considerable extra research for the 
programmer.  Indeed, what rules and correlations the machine deduces may 
forever remain a mystery. 
This principle was at work in a recent Stanford University study that 
aimed to build a machine learning algorithm that could analyze a person’s 
face and determine that person’s sexual orientation.201  Specifically, 
researchers compiled images of 75,000 users’ faces from various dating sites 
and used the profiles’ self-reported gay or straight identification to train the 
algorithm.202  From this pool of data, the algorithm focused on 35,000 images 
of 15,000 users to learn a set of correlations between the content of the 
images and the labels “gay” and “straight.”  Later, in a test set of different 
images that the machine had never seen before, the algorithm would make 
its best guess.203  The program was remarkably accurate at determining 
straight versus gay men, at eighty-one percent accuracy, and slightly less 
accurate at sorting gay versus straight women, at seventy-one percent.204 
Meanwhile, the machine was far more accurate than humans, who only 
correctly determined male sexual orientation sixty-one percent of the time 
and that of women fifty-four percent of the time.205  
 
 
 200 See Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus, What Artificial Experts Can and Cannot Do, 6 AI & SOC’Y 
18, 21 (1992) (further explaining the same American-Russian tank example).  The issue can even 
lead to needless deaths in emergency situations:  
    [One algorithm created to better triage emergency room patients] seemed to show that 
asthmatics with pneumonia fared better than the typical patient.  This correlation was real, 
but the data masked its true cause.  Asthmatic patients who contract pneumonia are 
immediately flagged [by doctors] as dangerous cases; if they tended to fare better, it was 
because they got the best care the hospital could offer.  A dumb algorithm, looking at this 
data, would have simply assumed asthma meant a patient was likely to get better—and 
thus concluded that they were in less need of urgent care. . . . The story of asthmatics with 
pneumonia eventually became a legendary allegory in the machine-learning community. 
  Kuang, supra note 196.   
 201 See Murphy, supra note 56. 
 202 Yilun Wang & Michael Kosinski, Deep Neural Networks Are More Accurate than Humans at Detecting Sexual 
Orientation from Facial Images, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 246, 248 (2018). 
 203 Id. at 249. 
 204 Id. at 250. 
 205 Id. at 253. 
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As to how the algorithm was making its relatively accurate determinations, 
the researchers could only speculate.  One of their hypotheses was that the 
levels of different hormones in gay versus straight users (the prenatal 
hormone theory of sexual orientation206) might have manifested some minute 
differences in their respective facial structures, differences unseen by the 
human eye but detectable by the algorithm.207  One researcher explained, 
“[h]umans might have trouble detecting these tiny footprints that border on 
the infinitesimal” but “[c]omputers can do that very easily.”208  With respect 
to men, presence of facial hair or baseball caps also probably played a role 
for some images.209  In other similar tests, researchers found that the images 
of gay men usually were better quality and had better lighting, and the 
algorithm may have used that as the basis to conclude the sexual 
orientation.210  Yet, the author of the Stanford study concedes that he could 
not say with certainty how the algorithm made its determinations.211 
B.  Why Machine Learning Is Unexplainable  
Machine learning is often unexplainable because of the sheer number of 
data points involved and “avalanche of statistical probability” involved.212  
Many techniques are at play or constantly being developed, and choosing 
among them can be the whim or preference of the programmer.  “The sheer 
proliferation of different techniques, none of them obviously better than the 
others, can leave researchers flummoxed over which one to choose.  Many 
of the most powerful are bafflingly opaque; others evade understanding 
because they involve an avalanche of statistical probability.”213 
Responding to that deficiency is an entirely new subfield of machine 
learning research, dubbed “xAI,” for “explainable AI.”214  The Defense 
 
 206 The prenatal hormone theory is commonly circulated but controversial in both the scientific and 
LGBT advocacy communities.  See Louis Hoffman & Justin Lincoln, Science, Interpretation, and Identity 
in the Sexual Orientation Debate: What Does Finger Length Have to Do With Understanding a Person?, 56 
PSYCCRITIQUES, Apr. 13, 2011, http://psqtest.typepad.com/blogPostPDFs/ 
201103880_psq_56-15_scienceInterpretationAndIdentifyInTheSexualOrientationDebate.pdf 
(reviewing SIMON LEVAY, GAY, STRAIGHT, AND THE REASON WHY: THE SCIENCE OF SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION (2011) and commenting on the controversy surrounding the introduction of science 
into politically charged areas such as sexual identity). 
 207 Wang & Kosinski, supra note 202, at 246. 
 208 Kuang, supra note 196.  
 209 See Murphy, supra note 56 (showing that the algorithm looked at factors like grooming habits). 
 210 Id.  
 211 Kuang, supra note 196.   
 212 Id.  
 213 Id.  
 214 See, e.g., Mark G. Core et. al., Building Explainable Artificial Intelligence Systems, 21 PROC. NAT’L CONF. 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1766, 1766 (2006) (setting forth a modular and generic architecture for 
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Department’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”) is 
currently conducting research into how AI technologies can explain their 
decision-making processes, though the field is still in its infancy.215  Thus, for 
the foreseeable future, any machine learning output that is admitted into 
evidence bears a substantial likelihood that it will be unexplainable.  
C.  Comparing Machine Learning to Current Unexplainable Evidence 
Few analogs exist to this problem in other forms of evidence used at trial.  
When scholars write about “black boxes” and evidence, they typically mean 
to highlight the fact that lay jurors do not fully understand how the device 
works—the implicit assumption is that experts do.  But as machine learning 
exists now, that assumption is faulty, since experts often cannot fully account 
for machine learning determinations, in spite of the machine’s demonstrable 
accuracy for certain tasks.  
Professor Rich analogizes algorithms to another black box with which 
courts are very familiar in the Fourth Amendment sphere: drug dogs.  With 
drug sniffing dogs just as in algorithms, “we know the inputs, and we receive 
the outputs, but we cannot fully understand how the internal mechanism 
works.”216  Professor Rich argues that treating algorithms in the way that we 
do dogs will allow “courts and police to ignore what they are ill-equipped to 
evaluate,” namely, how an algorithm works, and focus only on the accuracy 
of its outcomes.217  Professor Rich’s analogy is limited, however, to how 
algorithms may be used to develop reasonable suspicion or probable cause, 
and does not speak to admissibility or weight.  
A closer analogy might be “super recognizers,”218 or humans with the 
uncanny ability to recognize even the most blurry or corrupted images of a 
face to aid in investigations.219  The super recognizer essentially exploits two 
 
explaining the behavior of simulated entities); David Gunning, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), 
DARPA/I20, https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence (last visited Jan. 
5, 2018)  (arguing that explainable AI is necessary if users are to understand, trust, and effectively 
manage new AI).  
 215 Gunning, supra note 214. 
 216 Rich, supra note 11, at 912. 
 217 Id. at 919. 
 218 See Richard Russell et al., Super-recognizers: People with Extraordinary Face Recognition Ability, 16 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 252, 252 (2009) (defining the term super-recognizers).  
 219 Anna K. Bobak & Sarah Bate, Superior Face Recognition: A Very Special Super Power,  SCI. AM.. (Feb. 2, 
2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/superior-face-recognition-a-very-special-
super-power/ (“London’s Metropolitan Police have created a super-recogniser unit that is used to 
spot criminals in a crowd or within CCTV footage. . . . It’s easy to spot other potential roles for 
super-recognisers—issues of national security are currently paramount, and they may spot wanted 
or missing people more readily than typical officers.”).  
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capabilities in tandem.  First is the ability to remember a face after de minimis 
exposure, and second is the ability to recognize it in subsequent situations.  
How exactly a super recognizer memorizes the face with such precision is a 
mystery.  One hypothesis was that super recognizers holistically evaluate a 
face differently than the average layperson, though that possibility was 
debunked in subsequent research.220  Another hypothesis was that super 
recognizers spend longer than average looking at the eyes,221 though 
subsequent research showed they actually spend more time focusing on the 
nose and center of the face.222  In any case, the super recognizers cannot 
themselves articulate how their ability works, nor can other researchers 
provide a comprehensive explanation.  The super recognizers are a human 
black box.  
If a super recognizer were to testify at trial on the basis of her abilities and 
give inculpatory evidence, it would perhaps give some kind of analog to how 
a testifying expert cannot account for how a machine learning algorithm 
made the same kind of facial recognition determination.  At present, 
however, there is no documented use of a super recognizer testifying at trial, 
and thus no instance of how a judge rationalized the admissibility of one’s 
testimony, to say nothing of how jurors assigned it weight and credibility.223  
D.  Jurors’ Trust in Unexplainable Machine Learning Evidence 
It is an entirely open question the extent to which, in open court, jurors 
would trust the validity of unexplainable machine learning evidence.  Indeed, 
this question is ripe for empirical research by psychologists and legal scholars 
of scientific evidence.  
Developers understand that the extent to which a person trusts a machine 
in everyday life is highly variable and context-dependent.  Outside the 
courtroom, an individual’s trust in a machine ranges from none or little (for 
a variety of reasons, one of which is often because it is a machine224), to passive 
 
 220 Id. (“[O]nly modest links have been reported between face recognition ability and holistic 
processing skills, suggesting other factors may be at play.”). 
 221 Id. (“Eye-tracking technology has frequently been used by psychologists to identify the regions of 
the face that are particularly informative in face recognition.  Typical people tend to focus on 
the eyes, suggesting they carry important information about facial identity.”).  
 222 Id. (“[S]uper-recognisers spent more time viewing the nose.  These findings challenge existing 
conclusions, suggesting that it is the centre[sic] of the face, rather than the eye region, that is optimal 
for facial identity recognition.”). 
 223 Gary Edmond & Natalie Wortley, Interpreting Image Evidence: Facial Mapping, Police Familiars and Super-
Recognisers in England and Australia, 3 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 473, 492 (2016) (“So far there are no 
reported cases involving police super-recognisers as witnesses.”).  
 224 Berkeley J. Dietvorst et al, Algorithm Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms After Seeing Them Err, 
144 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (2014)  (“The results of five studies show that seeing 
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trust in machines without so much as a second thought225 (when the machine 
is functioning, that is226), and even up to great affirmative trust in a machine 
because it is a machine.227  Researchers find trust in machines to be highly 
variable and influenced by different factors like belief about the functionality 
of the technology, belief that the technology is helpful, and belief that the 
technology is reliable.228  Often, trust is dependent on mere different 
presentations of a technology—such as the inclusion of anthropomorphic 
qualities, for example229—and not by the capabilities of the machine itself.  
To be sure, trust itself means different things in different contexts, and 
the meanings may not necessarily translate from one situation to another.  
For example, consider voir dire, where a prosecutor hoping to use machine 
learning output at trial may question potential jurors about their trust in 
technology in specific situations.  It would be risky for the prosecution to 
assume, say, that a juror’s self-reported “trust in technology” would 
necessarily indicate trust in black-box machine output to prove a defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Inside the courtroom, how jurors will 
respond to machine learning output is very difficult to predict.  As Professor 
Roth summarizes, “juries might irrationally defer to the apparent objectivity 
 
algorithms err makes people less confident in them and less likely to choose them over an inferior 
human forecaster.”).  
 225 See Paul Robinette et al., Overtrust of Robots in Emergency Evacuation Scenarios, 11 ACM/IEEE INT’L 
CONF. HUMAN ROBOT INTERACTION 101, 104 (2016) (finding that in a simulated emergency 
situation 100% of human test subjects followed a guide robot to safety through the hallways of a 
building even when the robot led in directions opposite posted exit signs); see also id. (“Eighty-five 
percent of participants indicated that they would follow the robot in a future emergency.”). 
 226 See Davide Salanitri et al., Relationship Between Trust and Usability in Virtual Environments: An Ongoing 
Study, in HUMAN COMPUTER INTERACTION: DESIGN AND EVALUATION 49, 50 (Masaaki Kurosu 
ed. 2015) (“A low level of usability could compromise the users’ interaction with a product, thus 
affecting the individual’s trust in the technology . . . .”). 
 227 See Jennifer Saranow, Steered Wrong: Drivers Trust GPS Even to a Fault, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 18, 
2008, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120578983252543135 (“If your GPS device 
told you to drive off a clib would you do it?  Norman Sussman nearly did.”); see also The Office US, 
Michael Drives into a Lake—The Office US, YOUTUBE (Aug. 8, 2017) https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=DOW_kPzY_JY (satirizing the enormous trust that drivers have in turn-by-turn GPS 
navigation by depicting a driver intentionally driving into a lake because “maybe it’s a shortcut” 
and “the machine knows”). 
 228 Salanitri, supra note 226, at 50 (“[T]rust in a technology reflects at least three main beliefs about 
the attributes of a technology:  (i) belief about the functionality of the product, which refers to the 
capability of a technology to perform specific tasks; (ii) belief that the technology is helpful . . .  (iii) 
Belief that the technology is reliable, hence, the perception that a technology works properly.”).  
 229 For instance, even though the two technologies provide the same service, first-time passengers 
report more trust in Tesla’s self-driving technology than Google’s, owing in part Tesla’s 
incorporation of human-like qualities a voice and a name.  Google’s, meanwhile, has no 
anthropomorphic qualities. See Walter Frick, Tesla, Autopilot, and the Challenge of Trusting Machines, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (July 11, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/tesla-autopilot-and-the-challenge-of-
trusting-machines. 
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of machines, or reject machine sources because of an irrational mistrust of 
machines’ apparent complexities, even when the sources are highly 
credible.”230  
Additionally, inextricably linked to the credibility of the machine is the 
credibility the jurors extend to the testifying expert him- or herself.  That 
human credibility would likely affect credibility that jurors would extend to 
the underlying machine, especially as the scientific evidence at issue is 
particularly complex for laypeople.231   In that case, the prosecution or 
defense would surely already be familiar with the usual tactics to use to attack 
the expert’s credibility.  These tactics include choosing and preparing an 
expert who (1) appears to lack bias, (2) bears impressive credentials, (3) 
displays “a pleasant personality,” (4) can present “a clear, objective, focused, 
not overly long presentation that utilizes diagrams and models,” (5) uses lay 
terms, (6) demonstrates knowledge in the area of expertise, (7) gives testimony 
that is “complete, consistent, and not too complex,” and (8) shows familiarity 
with the instant case.232   As for attacking credibility, studies seem to show 
the classic methods are effective.  Jurors report less credibility for experts that 
seem like “hired guns,” as in experts that are highly paid and bear sterling 
credentials.233  Jurors also distrust witnesses that offer inconsistent statements 
between depositions and trial testimony.234  
 
 
 230 Roth, Testimony, supra note 17, at 2038 (2017); see also Hon. Donald E. Shelton et. al., An Indirect-
Effects Model of Mediated Adjudication: The CSI Myth, the Tech Effect, and Metropolitan Jurors’ Expectations 
for Scientific Evidence, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 8 (2009) (“Data in the Washtenaw County 
and Wayne County studies have demonstrated high expectations and demands for scientific 
evidence among jurors.  Other scholars and researchers have found similarly high expectations and 
regard for scientific evidence by jurors.”). 
 231 Researchers typically reason that jurors evaluate complicated expert testimony either by (1) 
evaluating the logic of the testimony itself and trying to understand the underlying science (i.e., 
“central processing”), or when that is difficult, (2) reverting to shortcuts, heuristics, or other means 
of evaluating the testimony (i.e., “peripheral processing”), which includes things like the credentials 
of the expert, how much the expert has been paid, or even the expert’s manner of speech or 
appearance.  See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony: 
Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441, 448 (2003) (“Cooper and 
Neuhaus concluded that jurors shifted from central to peripheral processing under cognitively 
challenging conditions.”).  
 232 Id. at 458. 
 233 Id. at 448 (“[M]ock jurors who heard testimony of a highly paid expert with high credentials— 
potentially fitting the profile of a hired gun—rated the expert as less likable, less believable, less 
trustworthy, less honest, and more annoying . . . .”).  
 234 Id. at 473 (“This shows that the common litigator tactic of pointing to differences between 
deposition and trial testimony can be effective in decreasing credibility.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Machine learning is already in our email clients, our web applications, 
our law firms, and our government’s regulatory agencies.  It will soon arrive 
in our courtrooms, too.  When it does, it will only be the latest in a long line 
of machine evidence that is admitted in spite of the risk of error it carries.  
While machine learning poses some risks under Federal Rule of Evidence 
702—namely that its data must be appropriately compiled and relevant to 
the given defendant—nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence inherently 
bars machine learning output as a form of evidence.  For its part, the 
Constitution and relevant precedent permit machine learning evidence even 
in spite of its unexplainability, even if the Sixth Amendment merely requires 
that the evidence be introduced with expert testimony. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
